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1962] RECENT DECISIONS 1177 
LABOR LAW-INJUNCTIONS-ORDER R.EsTRAINING ELECTION ABOARD 
"FLAG-OF-CONVENIENCE" VESSEL-Upon petition of the National Maritime 
Union, the National Labor Relations Board directed a representation elec-
tion1 among all unlicensed foreign seamen employed by Empresa Hon-
durena de Vapores, S.A., aboard a Honduran-registered ship. Empresa, a 
Honduran corporation which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the United 
Fruit Company, sought injunctive relief in a federal district court. The 
petition alleged that the Board's order violated treaty obligations,2 the 
Constitution of the United States3 and principles of international law.4 The 
Regional Director of the NLRB moved to dismiss, asserting that the district 
court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin such an order and that the Board's 
action was proper. The district court held that it had jurisdiction of the 
subject matter,5 but denied the injunction.6 On appeal, held, injunction 
granted. A federal district court may enjoin a representation election among 
foreign seamen where the NLRB has extended its jurisdiction into the 
foreign relations field by ordering such an election. Empresa Hondurena 
de Vapores v. McLeod, 300 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1962). 
In order to avoid high domestic labor costs and obtain numerous tax 
advantages,7 many American shipowners have registered their vessels in 
1 United Fruit Co., 134 N.L.R.B. No. 25 (Nov. 15, 1961). 
2 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights With the Republic of 
Honduras, Dec. 7, 1927, art. X, 45 Stat. 2618, T.S. No. 764. 
3 See Fay v. Douds, 172 F.2d 720, 723 (2d Cir. 1949). 
4 See COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF nm SEA § 310 (4th ed. 1959); RmNow, 
THE TEST ·OF TilE NATIONALITY OF A MERCHANT VESSEL 48-49, 77-78, 116, 152, 186-88, 
214, 218-19 (1937). See also Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1, 12 (1886); The Ester, 190 Fed. 
216, 221 (E.D.S.C. 1911); United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 157-58 (1933) (dictum); 
Comment, Labor Law, International Law and the Panlibhon Fleet, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 
1342, 1353-56 (1961). 
5 The jurisdictional holding was on the ground that Empresa had made a colorable 
allegation of a denial of constitutional rights. See Fay v. Douds, 172 F.2d 720, 723 (2d 
Cir. 1949). 
6 The injunction was denied on the grounds that the district court was not convinced 
of the probability of Empresa's success or by its claims of irreparable damage from the 
election. 
7 Hearings on Transfer of American Ships to Foreign Registry Before a Subcommittee 
of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17, 
71-82 (1949), 2d Sess. 534-69 (1950). 
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foreign countries, particularly Panama, Liberia and Honduras (the Pan-
libhon fleet). Due to the expansion of this fleet and the resultant decline 
in the employment of American seamen,8 American maritime unions have 
attempted to organize the foreign seamen aboard these ".flag-of-convenience" 
vessels. A notable amount of litigation has surrounded these union efforts, 
the bulk of it arising either in the courts to enjoin union picketing of the 
vessels, or before the NLRB in representation and unfair labor practice 
proceedings against the shipmvners.9 In the principal case two significant 
questions are raised: (1) whether the NLRB has authority under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act10 to entertain representation proceedings in the 
.flag-of-convenience area; and (2) if not, whether an employer can obtain 
injunctive relief against such proceedings in a federal district court. 
The applicability of American labor legislation to .flag-of-convenience 
shipping has been judicially considered in two principal areas: picketing 
and representation proceedings. In the picketing area, the Supreme Court 
has held that the NLRA11 does not apply to a controversy resulting from 
the picketing of a foreign ship operated by a foreign crew under foreign 
articles while temporarily in an American port.12 The Court's rationale 
was that Congress had not expressed any intent to apply the NLRA to 
such a situation and that it was not the Court's place "to run interference 
in such a delicate field of international relations."13 Three years later, 
however, the Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act14 applied to the 
picketing of a .flag-of-convenience vessel and precluded a federal district 
court from enjoining such picketing.15 Hence, the unavailability of NLRA 
8 See Shils, The "Flag of Necessity" Fleet and the American Economy, 13 LAB. L.J. 
151 (1962); Comment, Panlibhon Registration of American-Owned Merchant Ships: 
Government Policy and the Problem of the Courts, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 711, 715 (1960). 
9 See Comment, Labor Law, International Law and the Panlibhon Fleet, 36 N.Y.U.L. 
REV. 1342, 1343 (1961). 
10 49 Stat. 499 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958). 
11 Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as 
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1958). 
12 Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138 (1957). 
13 Id. at 146. 
14 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1958). 
15 Marine Cooks v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365 (1960); Hein v. Fianza Cia 
Nav., S.A., 279 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1960); Afran Transport Co. v. NMU, 169 F. Supp. 
416 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), motion to dismiss denied, 175 F. Supp. 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). The 
district court in Marine Cooks had granted an injunction on the ground that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act did not embrace foreign labor disputes and that the picketing was an un-
lawful interference with the internal economy of a foreign flag. 1959 Am. Mar. Cas. ll40 
(D. Ore.), aff'd, 265 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1959); see authorities cited note 4 supra. The 
Supreme Court, in distinguishing the Benz case, pointed out that the parties there were 
not engaged in a labor dispute, because the defendant unions were picketing the ships as 
a gesture of sympathy for the conditions of the alien crew, rather than in their own 
interests. However, the opinion in Benz did not seem to rest on this fact. The Court in 
Marine Cooks failed to point out that the two cases were decided under different statutes, 
and that an opposite holding in Benz might subject the flag-of-convenience fleet to the 
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administrative remedies, combined with the application of Norris-La-
Guardia restrictions, would seem to preclude foreign shipowners from 
seeking protection from union picketing in any federal court or agency.16 
Moreover, two state courts have refused to issue injunctions against shore-
side picketing of flag-of-convenience vessels, on the basis that the NLRB 
"arguably" has exclusive jurisdiction.17 This seems to suggest that the NLRA 
might be applicable to foreign flag shipping, thereby giving the foreign 
shipowners some means of obtaining relief from picketing.18 However, the 
reluctance of both state and federal courts to provide a definitive solution 
has left a hiatus in which the foreign employer is unable to obtain any 
relief. 
The applicability of the NLRA to flag-of-convenience vessels in repre-
sentation proceedings had been considered only by the NLRB prior to the 
principal case. The Board has held that the act applies in any case where 
the facts show a sufficient impact upon American commerce,19 and has 
relied on a "substantial contacts" test20 to justify its assertion of jurisdiction. 
regulatory provisions of the NLRA, which the Court ostensibly did not want, while 
application of Norris-LaGuardia would not achieve such a result. See Comment, 36 
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1342, 1346-47, 1358 (1961). 
16 The fear of such a situation caused the Ninth Circuit to affirm the issuance of an 
injunction in Marine Cooks v. Panama S.S. Co., 265 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 362 
U.S. 365 (1960); cf. Afran Transport Co. v. NMU, supra note 15, at 425. 
17 Incres S.S. Co. v. International Maritime Workers, IO N.Y.2d 218, 176 N.E.2d 719, 
219 N.Y.S.2d 21, cert. granted, 368 U.S. 924 (1961); Navios Corp. v. NMU, 402 
Pa. 325, 166 A.2d 625 (1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 905 (1961). 
18 Presumably, the only relief which could be applied for by the employer under the 
NLRA is a cease-and-desist order pursuant to § 8(b), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 
U.S.C. § 158 (1958), alleging that the picketing was an unfair labor practice. 
19 Eastern Shipping Corp., 132 N.L.R.B. 930 (1961); West India Fruit &: S.S. Co., 
130 N.L.R.B. 343 (1961); Peninsular &: Occidental S.S. Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1958). 
The Board has narrowly interpreted Benz v. Compania Naviara Hidalgo, S.A., 353 
U.S. 138 (1959), to stand for the proposition that the Board has no jurisdiction over 
labor activities involving a vessel whose only contact with American commerce is its 
transitory presence in an American port. There may be a further ground of distinction 
for, as the court in the principal cases states, "the Benz case did not directly involve 
the application of the panoply of labor regulation embodied in §§ 7, 8, 9 and 10 [of the 
NLRA], but only the provisions of § 303 of the Taft-Hartley Act [LMRA] relating to 
picketing •••. " Principal case at 234. See Note, The Effect of United States Labor 
Legislation on the Flag-of-Convenience Fleet, 69 YALE L.J. 498, 518-19 (1960). 
20 In Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953), the Supreme Court listed seven factors 
which it considered in determining whether sufficient contacts existed between an injured 
seaman, a shipowner-employer and American commerce to warrant recovery under the 
Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958). Of these, the law of the 
flag was deemed most important. 345 U.S. at 584-86. The flag law doctrine is a rule of 
customary international law-that the flag a ship flies is evidence of her national 
character, and that the law of the flag nation governs in any controversy. See authorities 
cited note 4 supra. The Second Circuit subsequently applied this test in Bartholomew 
v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1000 (1959), 
where the court placed significant reliance on the ultimate American ownership of the 
shipowner-employer; "the practice ••• of looking through the fa~de of foreign registra-
tion" was felt to be "essential unless the purposes of the Jones Act are to be frustrated 
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But such a test is subject to various interpretations. In the proceedings 
before the Board which resulted in the election order in the principal case, 
the Board determined that substantial contacts with American commerce 
were present;21 the court disagreed with the Board's findings and held 
that the NLRA should not be applied because the foreign interests sub-
stantially outweighed the domestic interests.22 Nevertheless, the "substantial 
contacts" test, albeit incapable of precise delineation, appears to be the 
most feasible line-drawing device presently available. The solutions availa-
ble, at the extremes, would be that the NLRA should be held to apply 
to every foreign ship that enters an American port or, alternatively, that 
regulatory labor legislation was intended by Congress to resolve disputes 
only between American employers and American employees.23 The trend 
evinced in the NLRB decisions24 and in the principal case would seem to 
militate against either of the extreme positions. Furthermore, due to the 
rapid growth of the Panlibhon fleet, conditions have substantially changed 
since the enactment of the NLRA, and American labor has considerable 
interests worthy of protection.25 Thus, a "substantial contacts" test 
would appear to be the better solution,26 but the balancing of foreign and 
domestic interests in the flag-of-convenience labor area should arguably 
not be left to the courts without the guidance of a clearer standard enun-
ciated by Congress. Possible factors, or "contacts," which might be taken 
into consideration are: the nationality of the seamen; their affiliation with 
other unions, foreign or domestic; the nationality of the shipowner; and 
the shipowner's connection with American interests, such as stock owner-
by American shipowners intent upon evading their obligations under the law by the 
simple expedient of incorporating in a foreign country and registering their vessels under 
a foreign flag." 263 F.2d at 442. In finding that this practice was well established, the 
court cited Zielinski v. Empresa Hondurena de Vapores, ll3 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), 
where the American stock ownership of the employer (the same as in the principal case) 
was held to be a controlling factor in finding sufficient American contacts for applying 
the Jones Act. See also Firipis v. The S.S. Margaritis, 181 F. Supp. 48 (E.D. Va. 1960); 
Bobolakis v. Compania Panamena Maritima San Gerassimo, S.A., 168 F. Supp. 236 
(S.D.N.Y. 1958). Contra, Moutzouris v. National Shipping &: Trading Co., 194 F. Supp. 
468 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Mproumeriotis v. Seacrest Shipping Co., 149 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 
1957); see Note 1959 DUKE L.J. 130, 136. 
21 The Board found that Empresa's maritime operations were "a part of a single 
integrated maritime operation under the continuous, direct control and either direct 
or ultimate ownership of .•• the United Fruit Company," and were "an essential part of 
a seagoing enterprise located in and directed from the United States and engaged in the 
commerce of this nation .••. " United Fruit Co., 134 N.L.R.B. No. 25 (Nov. 15, 1961). 
22 "The only United States contacts not matched by Honduran ones are United 
Fruit's stock ownership and its direction and use of the voyages; these arc substantially 
outweighed • . • by Honduras' interests." Principal case at 234. 
23 Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 143-44 (1957). 
24 See cases cited note 19 supra. 
211 See authorities cited note 8 supra. 
26 Such a test should also be applied in determining the applicability of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act and the NLRA. 
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ship, charterers and amount of trade conducted in and through United 
States ports. 
Assuming that substantial contacts do not exist with American com-
merce and that the Board has no authority under the NLRA to assert its 
jurisdiction, the second issue presented by the principal case is the re-
viewability of the NLRB election order, i.e., whether a foreign employer 
can prevent such an unauthorized assertion of jurisdiction by means of 
an injunctive suit in a federal district court. The NLRA provides for 
very limited judicial consideration of representation proceedings. Congress, 
in enacting the NLRA, set itself firmly against direct judicial review of 
representation matters due to the risk that time-consuming review might 
defeat the very objective of the act-rapid determination of labor disputes 
and the resultant promotion of industrial peace through collective bar-
gaining.27 It was feared that both union and management would be able 
to use litigation as a tactic to delay the initiation of collective bargaining.28 
When the act was amended in 1947, another attempt was made to provide 
for direct review in the courts of appeals.29 However, the proposed amend-
ment was eliminated in conference.30 Therefore, representation matters 
are presently made subject to judicial review only as a part of the record 
in proceedings to review final orders.31 The Supreme Court has held that 
a representation determination is not a final order.32 However, in Leedom 
v. K)•ne33 the Court made an exception to the limited opportunity for 
review. Leedom v. Kyne held that federal district courts have jurisdiction 
to enjoin NLRB representation orders where the Board has acted con-
trary to a "clear and mandatory" provision of the act.34 In subsequent in-
terpretations of the holding, it has usually been stated that unless the 
Board engages in action characterized by a departure from either statutory 
requirements, or those of due process, a federal district court does not have 
jurisdiction to enjoin NLRB section 9 representation proceedings.35 The 
27 93 CoNG. REc. 6444 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft). See Note, 29 Gro. WASH. L. 
REv. 948 (1961). 
28 S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1935); see H.R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 
1st Sess. 7 (1935); cf., Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 191-95 (1958) (dissenting opinion). 
29 H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 59-60 (1947). 
ao 93 CoNG. REc. 6444 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft); cf. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 94 (1947) (minority report). 
31 § 9(d), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(d) (1958). 
32 AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940). 
33 358 U .s. 184 (1958). 
34 The Board refused to take a vote among the professional employees pur-
suant to § 9(b)(I) of the NLRA, 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(I) 
(1958), to determine whether a majority of them would vote for inclusion in a bargaining 
unit consisting of both professional and non-professional employees in the certified 
bargaining unit. The Court held that the certification was made contrary to a specific 
provision of the act, and that injunctive relief was available to the injured union in a 
federal district court. 
85 See, e.g., Boyles Galvanizing Co. v. Waers, 291 F.2d 791 (10th Cir. 1961); Department 
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advocates of a narrow view of Leedom v. Kyne contend that to permit 
review where the Board has merely misconstrued the act would allow the 
same scope of review as that following a final order in an unfair labor 
practice case, thereby permitting review of the same issues twice.36 Further-
more, a narrow interpretation of the Leedom v. Kyne exception would 
appear to prevent employers and unions from engaging in dilatory tactics 
which would tend to frustrate the promotion of collective bargaining. 
However, the delay of the collective bargaining process is not the aim of 
the flag-of-convenience employers. Each idle day in an American port 
subjects them to irreparable injury. Apparently, therefore, the possible 
use of dilatory tactics was not a consideration in the principal case. 
It might appear, in fact, that the principal case could have been dis-
posed of under a limited interpretation of Leedom v. Kyne, and that the 
court unnecessarily extended it. The NLRA was found to be inapplicable 
to the situation. The Board's election order would therefore seem to have 
been an assertion of authority over a subject-matter not within its juris-
diction, and, hence, an "action taken in excess of its delegated powers."31 
On the other hand, it may be contended that since the inapplicability 
of the NLRA does not appear on the face of the act, the principal case 
cannot fit within a limited interpretation of Leedom v. Kyne. The K1•ne 
case appears to require that the Board's action violate the express language 
of the statute and not merely an underlying policy.38 Assuming a more 
extended judicial review is necessary to its resolution, the principal case 
has either created a new exception to the policy against limited review, 
although severely limiting this exception to the Board's assertion of juris-
diction over foreign flag shipping, or it has extended the Leedom v. Kyne 
exception to include a situation where the Board has asserted its juris-
diction contrary to an underlying policy of the act.39 While the question 
& Specialty Store Employees' Union v. Brown, 284 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1960); Leedom v. 
!BEW, 278 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1960); International Ass'n of Tool Craftsmen v. Leedom, 
276 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 815 (1960). In contrast to this strict inter-
pretation, others have viewed Leedom v. Kyne as representative of a new liberality in 
judicial review. Local 1545, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Vincent, 286 F.2d 127, 134 
(2d Cir. 1960) (dissenting opinion); Cox, The Major Labor Decisions of the Supreme 
Court, October Term 1958, in GELLHORN & BYsE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 441-48 (4th ed. 
1960); Hart, The Supreme Court 1958 Term, 73 HARv. L. REv. 84, 222 (1959); Polner, 
Representation Rights of Professional and Technical Employees, 10 LAB. L.J. 405 (1959). 
86 Once the election has been held and the bargaining unit certified, the employer 
can obtain judicial review by refusing to bargain and subjecting himself to a cease-and-
desist order for an unfair labor practice. See Hart, supra note 35, at 220. 
37 Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 190 (1958). 
38 In Leedom v. Kyne the Board's order was made "in excess of its delegated powers 
and contrary to a specific prohibition in the act. Section 9(b)(l) is clear and mandatory." 
358 U.S. at 188. 
89 Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Leedom v. Kyne, feared "that the ingenuity of 
counsel will, after today's decision, be entirely adequate to the task of finding some 
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is a close one, it appears that the latter view is the more likely. The court 
did not believe that Congress intended to limit the role of the courts to 
situations where the NLRB had acted in plain contravention of a specific 
statutory mandate.40 Leedom v. Kyne is to be given a broader interpreta-
tion in the field of foreign affairs than in the usual case of purely domestic 
significance.41 "If action ordered by the Board would trench on the juris-
diction of a foreign government contrary to the will of Congress, the best 
time to stop it is before the offense occurs, not somewhere along the line.''42 
In view of the significance of an extension of Leedom v. Kyne, the 
court's failure to set forth clear standards to determine in which other 
cases an extension can or should be made is troublesome. The suggestion 
is made43 that each court faced with such a situation should make up its 
mind whether Congress would or would not have wished it to intervene 
in the representation proceedings. The vagaries of such a standard would 
appear to preclude its use as an effective control over Board action, par-
ticularly in the flag-of-convenience labor area. The court attacked the 
issue of applicability of the NLRA to flag-of-convenience shipping after 
it had determined that the district court had jurisdiction to enjoin the 
representation proceeding, applying apparently different standards to each 
issue. An ostensibly better approach would be to predicate injunctive 
immunity on the applicability of the regulatory labor legislation. Using 
a "substantial contacts" test,44 if substantial American contacts are found, 
the Board is justified in asserting jurisdiction. But if the foreign interests 
outweigh the domestic, the Board would be acting outside of its authority 
in asserting jurisdiction, and injunctive relief would be available to the 
shipowner-employer in federal district courts to restrain the Board from 
interfering with the labor relations aboard :flag-of-convenience vessels. 
Lee D. Powar 
alleged 'unlawful action,' whether in statutory interpretation or otherwise, sufficient to 
get a foot in a district court door •••• " 358 U.S. at 195. Perhaps that door has now been 
opened. 
40 Principal case at 229. 
41 See Local 1545, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Vincent, 286 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1960), 
where the court could find no violation of a "clear and mandatory" statutory provision. 
42 Principal case at 229. 
43 Ibid. 
44 See cases cited note 20 supra. 
